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The Weak Protection of Strong
Encryption: Passwords, Privacy, and
Fifth Amendment Privilege
ABSTRACT
While the constitutional protection afforded private papers has
waxed and waned for more than a century, the Supreme Court has
greatly restricted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination-at least as applied to voluntarily prepared documents.
Specifically, where the government knows of the existence and location
of subpoenaed documents, the Fifth Amendment guarantee will not
justify a failure to produce them, unless the act of production would
itself incriminate the defendant. However, the Self-Incrimination
Clause still precludes the compelled creation of documents that are
both incriminating and testimonial.
The "private papers" doctrine has remained relatively stable for
approximately thirty years now, even though most documents-
including private "papers"--presumably exist on various digital media,
the retrieval of which require sophisticated, if ubiquitous, technology.
Arguably, encrypted documents do not comport well with the general
rule that discoverable materials must be produced in a readable
format. Few courts have ruled on motions to quash subpoenas for
encrypted files, and each has simply applied the private papers
doctrine with no discussion of whether encrypted documents warrant
special protection. While the decisions in these cases are reasonable
enough, decryption by court order would at least appear to compel
incriminating testimony-contrary to the Fifth Amendment.
Though unstated in the opinions, these courts may have agreed
with the many companies and commentators who compare the
encryption of documents to their placement in a locked safe. While
merely sequestering documents clearly does not protect them from a
valid subpoena, this simple analogy fails to capture several important
features of encryption. This Note considers an alternative
conceptualization that, while less intuitive, more accurately reflects
these important features. Under this paradigm, the private papers
doctrine probably still applies to encrypted contraband, but courts
should not adhere to an inappropriate analogy in any event. Ideally,
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the Supreme Court would expressly grant encrypted documents no
greater protection under the Fifth Amendment than that currently
afforded traditional private papers.
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The following situation frequently confronts law enforcement
officers from any number of government agencies.' As part of a raid or
routine inspection, an officer discovers images of child pornography or
other contraband on a computer. Sometimes the officer expects to find
the contraband-sometimes not. The person in possession of the
computer often cooperates, at least initially, freely revealing the illicit
files to the agent. With or without a warrant, the officer seizes the
computer, but inadvertently or improperly closes the files or shuts
down the computer. When the investigator or prosecutor attempts to
view the illegal material, either the file cannot be found at all, or it
cannot be opened because the file or the hard drive has automatically
1. See, for example, the facts of the Boucher case discussed infra Part I.C.2. At least in
Nashville, a diverse panoply of law enforcement agencies have joined the fight against child
pornography. They include: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Franklin Police Department
Internet Crimes Against Children Unit, Tennessee Association of Chiefs of Police, Tennessee
Bureau of Investigation, United States Secret Service, and United States Attorney's Office-all
of which sponsored a recent conference attended by the author: Identifying Online Child
Exploitation Crimes, held at the Nashville State Community College (Cookeville Campus) on
July 23, 2009.
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encrypted. With time to grasp the gravity of his situation, and
perhaps on the advice of a lawyer, the owner of the computer declines
further cooperation. Now the law enforcement agency faces a
dilemma, as its case against the suspect requires either a decrypted
version of the now encrypted file or the key to effect that decryption.
2
Without the key, cracking the code could easily require many years of
computer time. 3 If the suspect refuses to provide an unencrypted
version of the document (or the key) voluntarily, then the prosecutor
may resort to the subpoena power of a grand jury.
4
Whether such subpoenas are valid remains somewhat unclear
because no appellate court has yet ruled on the discoverability of
encrypted documents via grand jury subpoenas. The only trial courts
to rule on the issue, both within the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, have simply applied precedent for (unencrypted) "private
papers" to the situation at hand.5 In both cases, the courts found the
contested subpoena was (or would be) valid, if (and only if) the
government could independently authenticate the files,6 the existence
and location of which Were already known to the government. 7 Each
court found that the files had been voluntarily created, which
rendered their content exempt from Fifth Amendment protection;
8
2. See infra Part II.A for an overview of encryption.
3. As discussed in Part II.A, infra, decryption generally requires the "factoring" of
enormous numbers. Even the most powerful of computers require years to solve such
mathematical problems. For example, factoring a 664-bit number by networking one million
computers-each performing one million operations per second-would require some four
thousand years. See Phillip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 175 n.19 (1996) (citing BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY:
PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C, 284 n.11 (2d. ed. 1996)). However, such tasks
are hardly impossible; indeed, an even larger number has recently been factored with "many
hundreds" of computers working in tandem for nearly two years. See Thonsten Kleinjung et al.,
Factorization of a 768-bit RSA modulus (January 13, 2010), available at
http://eprint.iacr.org/2O10/006.pdf.
4. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIM. PROC. § 8.4(b) (3d ed. 2007).
5. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-CR-340, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32982 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006), affd, 570 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2009); see infra Part I.C.
6. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a) ('The requirement of authentication ... is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims."); See generally, CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES (6th ed. 2008).
7. See Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9-*10; Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32982, at *58-*59, *62.
8. See Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *6; Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32982, at *62.
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 12:3:581
thus, the entire analysis in each opinion considered whether the act of
production would invoke the privilege.9
Unquestionably, the documents (believed to be images of child
pornography) were created voluntarily in these cases,1 0 so that-had
the files remained unencrypted-this analysis would be squarely on
point. Both courts apparently ignored a disquieting detail though,
which arguably renders this analysis irrelevant: if, upon encryption,
the original document ceases to exist, then forcing the target of a
subpoena to provide an unencrypted version would appear to compel
the creation of a new and incriminating document, which contravenes
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Self-Incrimination Clause.11
While this argument probably fails in the end, it at least
warrants an analysis. 12 Though not explicit in the opinions, the
district courts may have conceptualized encryption in the same way
that many security companies, legal commentators, and even the
targets of subpoenas apparently have-as the placement of documents
in a locked safe. 13 This analogy does capture a few characteristics of
encryption, but it fails to account for several others. In particular,
placing documents in a safe obviously leaves their content intact,
while encryption alters the content of the original text in a meaningful
sense.14  The former system protects information by physically
sequestering it-and nothing more-while encryption scrambles the
message itself. This distinction renders comparisons with safes
inappropriate. 15
This Note proposes an alternative analogy that more
accurately embodies the important features of encryption. 16 The
proposed paradigm casts at least some doubt on the propriety of
deeming "voluntary" the compelled decryption of previously
voluntarily created but encrypted documents, at least when the
encrypted "document" consists of pure contraband. 17  While this
9. See Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *6-*10; Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32982, at *53-*63.
10. See Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *6 ('There is no question that the
contents of the laptop were voluntarily prepared or compiled [by the defendant] and are not
testimonial, and therefore do not enjoy Fifth Amendment protection."); Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32982, at *60 ("Defendant has already voluntarily asserted under oath that the seized
files contain his material.").
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Parts II and III.
13. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.k
15. See infra Part II.B.2.
16. See infra Part H.B.3.
17. See infra Part III.
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argument may ultimately prove unpersuasive, it suggests that courts'
extension of the "private papers" jurisprudence to encrypted
documents has stretched that common law doctrine a little too thin.'8
The Supreme Court should address this issue directly and, in the
interest of public policy, clarify that encrypted documents warrant no
more (and contraband perhaps even less) protection under the Fifth
Amendment than other private papers.
Part I of this Note traces the development of the private papers
doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme Court, interpreted by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and applied to encrypted
documents by two district courts within the Second Circuit. Part II
includes a brief, non-technical overview of encryption, examines two
common analogies with which it is often described, and suggests an
alternative comparison that better captures its unique features. Part
III considers whether the private papers doctrine should cover
encrypted documents, particularly contraband, under the rubric of the
proffered analogy. Part IV concludes that current doctrine probably
survives under the new paradigm, but in no event should additional
Fifth Amendment protection attach to encrypted documents.
I. "PRIVATE PAPERS" AND THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
A. The Supreme Court's Framework
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person.., shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."19 The
populist belief that liberty should preclude private papers from
government seizure found judicial sanction in Entick v. Carrington.
20
This English case, which predated the American Revolution, laid the
conceptual foundation for generous Fifth Amendment protection, as
first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States.
21
The Court in Boyd reversed a civil forfeiture where the defendants,
charged with avoiding the prescribed duty on imported glass, had
18. Part I.A, infra, outlines the "private papers" doctrine; Part III, infra, discusses the
extension of this doctrine to encryption.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) (holding that the seizure of
private papers by government officials-absent statutory or common law authority-constitutes
an illegal trespass, lest "the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom ... be
thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall
think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a
seditious libel."), available at http://www.constitution.org/trials/enticklentick_v_carrington.htm.
21. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (quoting extensively from, and relying on,
Lord Camden's opinion for the High Court in Entick).
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produced incriminating invoices under the compulsion of a court
order.
22
In so ruling, the Court apparently conflated the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with protections
found only in the Fourth 23: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause."24 For decades, the Court equivocated
on whether analysis under the Fourth Amendment necessarily
implicated the Fifth.25 Although subsequent decisions significantly
curtailed the broad scope of Boyd,26 its central holding that Fifth
Amendment principles protect private papers from government
compulsion regularly appeared as dictum in Court opinions for more
than eighty years. 27 Indeed, uncertainty as to the continued validity
of Boyd lingered for at least a century. 28
In Fisher v. United States, the Supreme Court markedly
narrowed its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.29  In a landmark
decision, 30 the majority found no Self-Incrimination Clause protection
for taxpayers who defied summonses from the Internal Revenue
Service directing them to produce tax returns prepared by their
accountants. 31 Characterizing the preparation of these documents as
22. Id. at 537.
23. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 127, at 183 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992);
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION 180 (4th
ed. 2007) (noting that subsequent decisions "returned to Boyd's mix of the fourth and fifth
amendment rationales.").
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. Compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (rejecting immunity under all
circumstances for private papers without relying on the Fifth Amendment), with Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 309 (1921) (holding that search warrants "may not be used as a means of
gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to
secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding.").
26. E.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 7 (1948) (government may subpoena
legislatively mandated business records).
27. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
1993) (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), and Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911)); see also id. at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973)).
28. Id. at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting) ("In sum, although Boyd's continued vitality has
been questioned, its pronouncement that personal papers are protected by the Fifth Amendment
has never been expressly overruled.").
29. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976) (without dissent).
30. Robert P. Mostellar, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment
Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (calling Fisher a "major watershed, signaling a fundamental
departure from earlier Fifth Amendment doctrines.").
31. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
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"wholly voluntary," the Court found antithetical the petitioners' claim
of compulsion. 32 Subsequent decisions reiterated this limitation on
Fifth Amendment protection that only the compelled creation of
documents would render their content inadmissible. 33  Fisher
preserved Fifth Amendment protection only against the production-
not the substance-of compelled, incriminating testimony.
34
In reaffirming Fisher, later Courts emphasized that private
papers do not invoke the privilege merely because their content would
tend to incriminate the defendant. 35 In United States v. Doe, Justice
O'Connor wrote separately to stress that "the Fifth Amendment
provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of
any kind."36  The Supreme Court next considered the issue in
Baltimore Department of Social Services v. Bouknight.37  While
Bouknight involved the production of a child, rather than private
papers, the Court cited with approval Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Doe.38 Whether her stringent position has attained the status of
binding precedent remains unclear, 39 and lower courts have been left
to extrapolate the precise contours of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on this issue.
40
In rejecting the last vestiges of Boyd, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reasoned that, while no other member of the
32. Id.
33. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 n.10 (1984) ("If the party asserting the Fifth
Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the
contents of the document are not privileged.").
34. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 n.11 ("In the case of a documentary subpoena, the only thing
compelled is the act of producing the document and the compelled act is the same as the one
performed when a . . . document not authored by the producer is demanded.") (citing 1
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 128, at 269 (4th ed. 1992)).
35. Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) ("[A] person
may not claim the [Fifth] Amendment's protections based upon the incrimination that may result
from the contents or nature of the thing demanded.").
36. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
37. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
38. Id. at 555.
39. Doe, 465 U.S. at 619.
Contrary to what Justice O'Connor contends... I do not view the Court's opinion in
this case as having reconsidered whether the Fifth Amendment provides protection
for the contents of "private papers of any kind." This case presented nothing remotely
close to the question that Justice O'Connor eagerly poses and answers. First, . . . the
issue whether the Fifth Amendment protects the contents of the documents was
obviated by the Court of Appeals' ruling relating to the act of production and statutory
use immunity. Second, the documents at stake here are business records which
implicate a lesser degree of concern for privacy interests than, for example, personal
diaries.
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
40. See infra Part I.C for cases applying this doctrine to encrypted documents.
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Court joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion, "the decision in Bouknight
suggests that a majority of the Court now agrees with her position." 41
In the same opinion, the Second Circuit neatly summarized the
paradigm shift from the relics of Boyd to Fisher and its progeny:
The Court no longer views the Fifth Amendment as a general protector of privacy or
private information, but leaves that role to the Fourth Amendment. Self-incrimination
analysis now focuses on whether the creation of the thing demanded was compelled,
and, if not, whether the act of producing it would constitute compelled testimonial
communication.
4 2
In its most recent decision directly on point, the Supreme Court
appears to have followed this Second Circuit opinion-though without
explicitly citing it. 43 With no negative history at all, and a substantial
following of district court decisions in its wake, this Second Circuit
case remains good law and warrants close inspection.
B. The Second Circuit's Interpretation
The Second Circuit implemented the Fisher framework with a
two-prong test.44 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the defendant
(known only as John Doe), responded to an investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by providing the
government with a copy of his personal datebook.45  Federal
prosecutors, having obtained this reproduction from the SEC, became
suspicious that Doe had blotted out certain entries before
photocopying the pages.46 A grand jury, which had convened to
consider charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, issued a
subpoena directing the defendant to produce the original version of
41. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir.
1993).
42. Id. at 93 (citations omitted).
43. Compare United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000) ("[The act of producing
documents in response to a subpoena may have a compelled testimonial aspect.... By 'producing
documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness would admit that the papers existed,
were in his possession or control, and were authentic."') (quoting Doe, 465 U.S. at 613), with In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d at 93 ("While the contents of
voluntarily prepared documents are not privileged, the act of producing them in response to a
subpoena may require incriminating testimony in two situations: (1) 'if the existence and location
of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government'; or (2) where production would
'implicitly authenticate' the documents.") (quoting United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.
1983)).
44. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d at 93.
45. Id. at 89.
46. Id.
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the datebook.47  While objecting to the subpoena, the defendant
nevertheless allowed the government to examine the calendar.
48
Despite the apparent doctoring of key entries, the district judge
denied the government's motion to compel production of the datebook,
apparently finding its substance protected by the Self-Incrimination
Clause:
[T]he content of the original document as originally written or revised was not published
to anyone; the disclosure of a purported copy to the SEC was not a publication of the
original; the original document was not voluntarily disclosed to the SEC or to the
Assistant United States Attorney. The original document is subject to the privilege of
the Fifth Amendment in its original and its present altered (if it was) form.
4 9
On appeal, though, a panel of Second Circuit judges carefully traced
the line of Supreme Court cases from Boyd to Bouknight and
concluded that "because Doe voluntarily prepared the calendar, its
contents are not protected by the Fifth Amendment.
'50
Citing its own precedent, the appeals court acknowledged that
a subpoena may compel incriminating testimony-in violation of the
Fifth Amendment-in two situations: "(1) 'if the existence and location
of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government';5 1 or (2)
where production would 'implicitly authenticate' the documents.
5 2
Hence, where the government can independently authenticate
documents, including private papers, known to exist in a particular
place, the Fifth Amendment privilege affords absolutely no protection
from an otherwise valid subpoena.53
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 90.
50. Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1983)). Conversely,
"[p]roduction may not be refused 'if the government can demonstrate with reasonable
particularity that it knows of the existence and location of subpoenaed documents."' Id. (quoting
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 13, 1984, 616 F. Supp. 1159, 1161
(E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
52. Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 13, 1984, 616 F.
Supp. 1159, 1161 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
53. However, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) has signaled his willingness to
reconsider Fifth Amendment protection, the current (narrow) interpretation of which he views as
inconsistent with the Founders' intent. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("A substantial body of evidence suggests that the Fifth Amendment
privilege protects against the compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of
any incriminating evidence. In a future case, I would be willing to reconsider the scope and
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause."). But see Donald Dripps, Self-Incrimination, in THE
HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 335, 335-36 (David Forte et al. eds., 2005) ('The
Founders... regarded the privilege as valuable enough to include in the Constitution, but their
own practice [of pretrial questioning by a magistrate] put considerable pressure on defendants to
surrender incriminating information before trial."). Over the last half-century, conservative
justices have generally sought to circumscribe-if not actually reverse-the robust rights,
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In considering the facts before it, the appellate court found
neither the particularity nor the authentication prong of its test
satisfied.54 The defendant had undeniably possessed and controlled
the calendar; indeed, he had previously testified to that effect and
produced a copy of the original. 55 Thus, having openly owned the
datebook, "its existence and location are 'foregone conclusions,' and his
production of the original 'adds little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government's information.' 56 As for authentication, the government
could establish that Doe had already submitted a photocopy, and it
could then allow jurors to compare that reproduction with the original
document. "Accordingly, because Doe's compliance with the subpoena
would require mere 'surrender' of the calendar, and not 'testimony,'
Doe has no act of production privilege."57  Finding neither prong
applicable, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
the government's motion to compel production of the calendar.
58
C. District Courts Apply "Private Papers" to Encrypted Files
Recent cases, while extremely sparse, provide important
insight as to how trial courts have applied the Supreme Court's Self-
Incrimination Clause jurisprudence-with its emphasis on private
papers-to encrypted computer files, at least through the filter of
Second Circuit precedent. 59
1. Authentication
In United States v. Pearson, the defendant faced multiple
charges, such as producing, distributing, receiving, and possessing
particularly Fifth Amendment protections, gradually afforded criminal defendants during this
period. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 572 (3d. ed., 2007).
54. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d at 90
("Because neither of these situations exist here, Doe has no act of production privilege.").
55. Id. at 89.
56. Id. at 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)).
57. Id. at 93-94.
58. Id. at 88.
59. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-CR-340, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32982 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006), affd, 570 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2009). Outside of the Second
Circuit, no other court has directly addressed the issue of when the government may compel
passwords to access encrypted files. Such a scarcity of case law seems unlikely to persist,
however, as encryption software becomes cheaper, stronger, and easier to implement. In
particular, those who trade in child pornography, often adept users of computer technology, will
inevitably exploit encryption with ever increasing frequency. As the issue confronts more courts,
judges will presumably consider the limited case law from the Second Circuit. Whether that
precedent will prove persuasive in other jurisdictions, however, remains to be seen.
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child pornography. 60 While still preparing for trial, the government
learned that Pearson, having made bail, had reacquired the very
images originally confiscated.6 1 Obtaining a search warrant, the
government seized computer equipment belonging to Pearson's father,
an attorney with whom the defendant now lived.
6 2
During a forensic examination of these materials, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found encrypted files in a folder labeled
"steganosencryptionsafes. 63  The investigation also uncovered an
email from "staganos.asknet.de" to an America Online alias registered
to the defendant ("Peal12065").64 The message included a password
and serial number enabling him to download encryption software.
65
One week later, "Peal12065" (also known as "Ov") emailed a confidant:
"Ov has a "safe" for securing data & will change his password then so
that no computer or human can retrieve saved data. The thing
encrypts immediately (live/realtime) and will have a password like:
eolKleGH93*vfO&3Gw4kn&jd."
66
60. Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *1; See United States Criminal Code,
Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children, Sexual Exploitation of Children, 18 U.S.C. §
2251(a) (2009) (production); United States Criminal Code, Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse
of Children, Certain Activities Relating to Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of Minors,
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2009) (distribution); United States Criminal Code, Sexual Exploitation
and Other Abuse of Children, Certain Activities Relating to Material Involving the Sexual
Exploitation of Minors, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (2009) (receipt); United States Criminal Code,
Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children, Certain Activities Relating to Material
Involving the Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(b) (2009) (possession). The
stakes are extremely high in these cases: even a first time offender faces a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years imprisonment for receipt or distribution of child pornography; production
of the same carries a fifteen-year minimum. See id. Recently, a small but significant minority of
federal judges have openly resisted the imposition of such penalties, deeming them unnecessary
and unjust. Compare Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, ABA JOURNAL, June 2009, at 54-59,
available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a-reluctant-rebellion, with Alexandra
Gelber, A Response to A Reluctant Rebellion, U.S. Department of Justice (July 1, 2009), available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminallceos[ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf.
61. Id. at *6-*8.
62. Id.
63. For the latest "Safe" offered by Steganos, see infra note 66.
64. Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *13.
65. PGP software is widely available. See, e.g., International PGP Homepage, Freeware,
http://www.pgpi.org/products/pgp/versions/freeware (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (listing more than
100 freeware versions of PGP available for download). Phil Zimmermann created the encryption
system "Pretty Good Privacy" (or PGP) in 1991. International PGP Homepage, History,
http://www.pgp.com/aboutpgp-corporationlhistory.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). For
background information on another "public key" encryption system-RSA (named for Rivest,
Shamir, and Adleman, the mathematicians who invented it)-see infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
66. Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *7. Many commentators have analogized
encryption to a safe. See, e.g., Reitinger, supra note 3, at 173-78. Commercial providers of
encryption software also embrace this analogy. Steganos advertises the latest version of its
product-literally called "Safe"-with an explicit comparison: "Works like a real safe to protect
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On one of the seized hard drives, the forensic examination
uncovered an encrypted 2.3 gigabyte folder-large enough to contain
many image files. 67 While the FBI suspected that these files depicted
sexually explicit images of minors, encryption thwarted the
investigation.68 For this reason, the government obtained a subpoena
demanding the production of all relevant passwords at trial. 69 The
defendant moved to quash on grounds that his Fifth Amendment
privilege extended to producing passwords.70
The government argued that the arbitrary nature of such a
password precludes Fifth Amendment protection of its content for two
reasons.71  First, an inherently meaningless string of characters
cannot itself convey incriminating information. 72 Second, such a long
sequence of random symbols would prove difficult to memorize,
suggesting the defendant likely wrote it down-and Fifth Amendment
protection excludes voluntarily produced writings.73  Pearson
apparently failed to rebut either of these arguments, thus conceding
this important point.74
Even assuming that the Self-Incrimination Clause exempts
from its protection any content a password may embody, the
defendant nevertheless claimed his act of production would still lie
within its scope. 75 After summarizing the Supreme Court and Second
Circuit precedent, the district judge applied law to facts:
[C]ompliance with the subpoena does not tacitly concede the existence or location of the
computer files because the files are already in the Government's possession. Their
existence is a foregone conclusion. Further, the Government has already concluded
data-no one can get in without a password." Steganos, Safe Overview,
http://www.steganos.com/us/products/data-security/safe/overview (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
67. Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *13. Privacy advocates will presumably
cry foul here: why should relatively large, encrypted files warrant an inference of guilt? Indeed,
the government sought to introduce "evidence that various files on computer media, including a
2.3 gigabyte file on an external hard drive, are encrypted, as consciousness of guilt." Id. at *42
n.4 (emphasis added). Surely encryption is not probative of guilt independent of the content
encrypted. In fairness, the government also sought to introduce "any sexually explicit images of
minors involved (in the event they are located on the encrypted computer media), as direct
evidence of reacquiring and receiving the images." Id. Absent this "direct evidence," however,
dangling encrypted files (of unknown content) before the jury would merely bait the defendant
into proffering an innocent explanation, lest the jury infer an incriminating one. Such a dilemma
surely lies at the very core of any right to silence. See id.
68. Id. at *13-*14.
69. Id. at *3.
70. Id. at *52.
71. Id. at *53-54.
72. Id. at *54.
73. Id. at *53 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976)).
74. Id. at *54.
75. Id.
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upon forensic examination that they are encrypted. The Government has also rightfully
obtained information from Defendant indicating that he intended to encrypt certain
files, and that Defendant was provided with encryption software. Thus, the existence
and use of encryption software on the files recovered from Defendant is all but a
for[e]gone conclusion, and knowledge of the actual password adds little to what the
Government already knows in this regard.
7 6
Given these circumstances, the court found that the government had
met its burden under the first prong of the Circuit's test: the
government had described with reasonable particularity the location
of certain files known to exist.77
Unfortunately, an unusual complication muddled the court's
analysis under the second prong. The defendant's father, whose
computer the government had seized, rather belatedly claimed to
represent the defendant as his attorney. 78 Though contrary to the
evidence, he further asserted that his legal relationship with the
defendant had commenced before the confiscation, thus rendering the
relevant documents immune from subpoena by the attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine. 79 With this new twist, the court
labored to unravel the authentication issue in the face of conflicting
affidavits made by the defendant.80 On the one hand, he had "already
voluntarily asserted under oath that the seized files contain[ed] his
material."81 On the other hand, he claimed that an attorney, namely
his father, had prepared at least some of the confiscated documents.8 2
Conceivably then, the defendant lacked ownership or control over
some parts of the encrypted hard drive. 3 From this tangle of proof
and privilege, the court teased out the evidentiary implication:
"[P]roduction of the password would provide powerful evidence on the
issue of authentication of the encrypted files that his father did not
produce because it would provide a link in the chain of ownership and
control of any incriminating encrypted files. '8 4 In light of this finding,
the district court scheduled a pretrial hearing to determine whether
the government could authenticate the encrypted files by means other
76. Id. at *58-59.
77. Id. at *57; see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d
87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that, under Fisher, incriminating testimony results only "if the
existence and location of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government.").
78. Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *8-*9, *14.
79. Id. at *20-*21.
80. Id. at *24-*25.
81. Id. at *60 (citations to the record omitted).
82. Id. at *21.
83. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (establishing the 'link in the
chain of evidence" rule).
84. Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *62 (citing Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486).
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than compelled production of the password.8 5 Pending the outcome of
this hearing, the court reserved judgment on defendant's motion to
quash the subpoena.
8 6
The decision in this complex case faithfully comports with both
Fisher and In re Grand Jury Subpoena: where the government can
independently authenticate documents known to exist in a particular
location, the Fifth Amendment will not protect them from an
otherwise valid subpoena. However, the parties apparently did not
raise-and the court did not discuss-the issue of whether this rule
should apply to encrypted documents. This Note presents the uneasy
case for why encrypted documents warrant special consideration.
8 7
2. Existence and Location
In Boucher, an even more recent decision from the Second
Circuit, the court focused its attention on the first prong of the In re
Grand Jury Subpoena test.8 8 In that case, the defendant had sought
to enter the United States from Canada, when a U.S. Customs and
Border Protection inspector searched his laptop computer and found
approximately forty thousand images, at least some of which had file
names clearly indicative of child exploitation.8 9 Further inspection by
a Special Agent for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
revealed pornographic images of both children and adults. 90 Boucher
admitted that sometimes, while searching for the latter, he
85. Id. at *62.
86. Id. at 63. This partial victory failed to exculpate Pearson, however, who
subsequently pled guilty to multiple counts of producing, transporting, receiving, and possessing
child pornography. United States v. Pearson, 570 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2009). Although the Second
Circuit vacated an order to pay restitution in the amount of $974,902 to one of the victims, and
again remanded the case for this limited purpose, the appellate court otherwise upheld the
district court's conviction and sentencing. Id.
87. See infra Parts II and III.
88. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D.
Vt., Feb. 19, 2009).
89. While Pearson and Boucher both dealt with child pornography, the definition of
"contraband" includes all manner of illicit material: "1. Illegal or prohibited trade; smuggling. 2.
Goods that are unlawful to import, export, or possess." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (8th ed.
2004). Whether a statute banning possession of videos depicting animal cruelty
unconstitutionally limits speech has recently drawn the attention of the Supreme Court. See
United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1984 (U.S. April
20, 2009) (No. 08-769); see also Krista Gesaman, Kitty Stomping is Sick, NEWSWEEK, October 3,
2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/216740 (questioning whether images of animal
cruelty are equivalent to child pornography).
90. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13006, at *4-*5 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009)
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unknowingly downloaded the former, but claimed to have deleted such
images when he realized their content.91
Upon request, the defendant voluntarily opened the computer's
Z drive, which the special agent had unsuccessfully attempted to
access. 92 Determining that these images met the definition of child
pornography, the special agent arrested Boucher and shut down the
laptop. 93 Subsequently, the government could neither find nor open
the Z drive, which had encrypted automatically and required a
password to recover.
94
On Fifth Amendment grounds, a magistrate judge granted
defendant's motion to quash a grand jury subpoena directing him to
provide this password.95 Under de novo review, however, the district
court judge rejected the magistrate's order and denied the motion to
quash.96 As in Pearson, the Boucher court quickly quelled any
contention that the substance of the encrypted material might
warrant shielding under the Self-Incrimination Clause: "There is no
question that the contents of the laptop were voluntarily prepared or
compiled and are not testimonial, and therefore do not enjoy Fifth
Amendment protection."
97
Whereas the magistrate had deemed the "foregone conclusion"
rationale inapplicable because the government had viewed only a
small portion of the Z drive (and hence could not know whether most
of the files contained incriminating materials or not), the district court
rejected this reasoning: "Second Circuit precedent ... does not require
that the government be aware of the contents of the files; it requires
the government to demonstrate 'with reasonable particularity that it
knows of the existence and location of subpoenaed documents."'
98
While denying the motion to quash, the district court forbade
the government from exploiting defendant's compliance with the
91. Id. at *5.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. To avoid this problem, law enforcement officers are often trained not to shut down
any computer equipment seized without expert assistance. Similarly, many law enforcement
agencies, as a matter of policy, attempt to serve search warrants on a suspected pedophile when
child pornography is likely to be contemporaneously displayed on his computer screen-thus
circumventing the encryption problem entirely. See Identifying Online Child Exploitation
Crimes, supra note 1.
95. The government later clarified that production of an unencrypted version of the Z
drive, in lieu of the password, would also suffice. See Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at
*6.
96. Id. at *10-*11.
97. Id. (citing Fisher at 409-10 and United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984)).
98. Id. at *8 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1
F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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subpoena to authenticate the unencrypted files before a jury.99 The
district court certainly found persuasive-perhaps even dispositive-
the defendant's incriminating cooperation,100 the absence of which
might well have affected the outcome:
Boucher accessed the Z drive of his laptop at the ICE agent's request. The ICE agent
viewed the contents of some of the Z drive's files, and ascertained that they may consist
of images or videos of child pornography. The government thus knows of the existence
and location of the Z drive and its files.
1 0 1
Moreover, because Boucher had already admitted to possessing the
computer, and previously provided the ICE agent with Z drive access,
the government assured the court that sufficient evidence tied the
defendant to the encrypted files-even without his compelled act of
production.102 As in Pearson, the court in Boucher followed the
precedents set out by the Supreme Court in Fisher and the Second
Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, but without considering
whether encrypted documents logically lie within the scope of the
holdings of those cases. The nature of encryption suggests that
encoded documents at least warrant a different analysis-if not a
different result. An appreciation for why courts ought to afford




The concept of secret writing is probably as old as writing
itself.'0 3 The very hallmark of the written word-its permanence-
creates a vulnerability for sensitive information. 10 4 Of course, one
99. Id. at *10.
100. Similarly, cooperation doomed John Doe, who voluntarily allowed the government to
examine the calendar he had doctored. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct.
29, 1992, 1 F.3d at 89. Likewise, Pearson undermined his authentication defense when he
complained that the government had seized "his" materials. See Pearson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32982, at *60.
101. Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9.
102. Id. at *10.
103. Cryptography, as opposed to other forms of secret writing, dates back at least four
thousand years to ancient Egypt, where cryptic hieroglyphics decorated the tombs of kings. See
Fred Cohen & Associates, 2.1 A Short History of Cryptography, http://all.net/bookslip/Chap2-
1.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
104. Misplaced battle plans are an important example. Robert E. Lee's secret instructions
for his confederate generals at the Battle of Antietam famously fell into enemy hands, but the
cautious union commander, George B. McClellan, characteristically squandered the opportunity.
2010] PASSWORDS, PRIVACY, AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 597
means of safeguarding an important document is to physically
sequester it. This strategy might include hiding the document in a
secluded location. The drawback of this approach is that secret hiding
places might be difficult for the creator of the document to access as
well, thus hindering the his ability to read it again. After all, if future
access is completely unimportant, the document might as well be
destroyed. This tension between privacy and accessibility has driven
the development of codes and ciphers, particularly in the context of
warfare. 1
05
Ciphers, which encode messages by replacing one set of letters
or symbols with another set of letters or symbols, predate modern
languages altogether. 10 6 Caesar sent messages to the battlefront by
shifting the alphabet forward by exactly three letters. 10 7 Upon receipt
of the cipher, his generals would simply shift the letters back and read
the message. 08 Obviously, the security of this system depended
entirely on the secrecy of the method. As the technique became widely
known, such a "shifting" cipher could no longer serve its purpose. 10 9
Modern cryptographic systems employ a different approach:
the method of encryption is often made freely available, and users
actually publish "half' of their keys." 0 Such public key encryption
See Harvey Craft, Robert E. Lee's Lost Battle Orders, SUITE10l.COM, Jan. 21, 2010, http://us-
civil-war.suitel0l.com/article.cfm/robert-elees-lost-battleorders.
105. Id.
106. Ancient civilizations of the Mesopotamia created "atbash" ciphers-wherein the first
and last characters of the alphabet are exchanged, the second and second-to-last letters are
traded, and so forth (so that ABC becomes ZYX and conversely). Id.
107. Thus, "veni, vidi, vici" ('I came, I saw, I conquered"-attributed to Julius Caesar in
47 B.C.) would become "zmqm, zmgm, zmfm" (in the classical Latin alphabet). See Chris
Savarese & Brian Hart, Cryptography: The Caesar Cipher, http://starbase.trincoll.edu/-crypto/
historicallcaesar.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
108. Id.
109. Of course, an improvement can be made by shifting up (or down) some other number
of letters, but an enemy need only try all twenty-two possible shifts (classical Latin had no "j,"
"u," or "w") to recover the message. Substituting the letters arbitrarily vastly increases the
number of possibilities-to a whopping 25,852,016,738,884,976,639,999 for a twenty-three letter
alphabet. Yet, given a long enough message, many amateurs can easily solve such puzzles
(generally called "cryptograms" in English) by exploiting the frequency of certain letters and the
spelling patterns of familiar words. (Try this one: "L fdph, L vdz, L frqtxhuhg."-Mxolxv
Fdhvdu.)
110. See RSA Laboratories, What is public-key cryptography?,
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2165 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) (explaining the basic
concept of public key encryption); Prime Number Hide-and-Seek: How the RSA Cipher Works,
http://www.muppetlabs.coml-breadbox/txt/rsa.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (basic
mathematical introduction to RSA). As the most popular public key encryption system, RSA has
stood the test of time. See Sara Robinson, Still Guarding Secrets After Years of Attack, RSA
Earns Accolades for Its Founders, 36 SIAM NEWS 5 (2003), available at
http://www.msri.org/people/members/sara/articles/rsa.pdf; see also Dan Boneh, Twenty Years of
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systems are analogous to email systems: a user makes his address
widely known so that others can send him information, while his
password remains secret so that no one but he can read what others
have sent.111 Understanding the paradigm-public addresses coupled
with private passwords-does not get an identity thief very far,
though, since he knows only that some unknown password will unlock
the inbox.112 If a particular password is compromised, the entire
system need not be discarded-the user simply creates a new
password.
While the mathematics enabling both cryptography1 13 (making
codes) and cryptanalysis (breaking them) lie well beyond the scope of
this Note,1 14 encryption ultimately derives its power from a simple
truth, one that any elementary student can readily appreciate: certain
arithmetic problems are easy to ask but hard to answer. 1 5 While
computers enable faster solutions, they also engender harder
problems.11 6 Even as the exponential increase in processing speed
Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem, 46 NOTICES OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY 202-13
(1999), available at http://crypto.stanford.edul-dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf (mathematical
overview).
111. But see Tom Van Vleck, The Risks of Electronic Communication,
http://www.multicians.org/thvv/emailbad.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (warning that system
administrators, software bugs, and security break-ins pose risks to the confidentiality of email).
112. See Tom Van Vleck, The History of Electronic Mail, http://www.multicians.org/thvv
mail-history.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (personal account of the development of many
familiar features of electronic communication).
113. See generally Cybernetica Institute of Information Technology, Cryptology Pointers,
http://research.cyber.ee/-lipmaa/crypto (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) (collecting and organizing
thousands of links to websites related to various aspects of cryptography).
114. For such a discussion, see Reitinger, supra note 3 (citing BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C, 284 n.l1 (2d. ed. 1996)).
115. Many encryption strategies take advantage of certain mathematical operations that,
though reversible, are much easier to perform "forwards" than '"backwards." See W. Diffie & M
Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY
644-54 (discussing "one-way" or "trap-door" functions as applied to public key encryption).
Factoring provides a simple yet powerful example. See generally Richard Brent, Recent Progress
and Prospects for Integer Factorisation Algorithms, in 1858 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER
SCIENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTING AND
COMBINATORICS 3-22 (2000), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=
10.1.1.36.6833 (turn-of-the-century evaluation of integer factoring). Some whole numbers-the
ones you use to count sheep (as opposed to fractions, negatives, and more exotic quantities)-are
the product of smaller (whole) numbers. See The Prime Pages, http://primes.utm.edu (last visited
Mar. 22, 2010). For example, thirty is the product of six and five, while six is the product of two
and three. For this reason, whole numbers like thirty (and six) are called "composites," while the
"factors" five, two, and three-which cannot be expressed as products of still smaller whole
numbers-are called "primes." Id. While multiplying large (prime) numbers together is quite
tedious, factoring a large composite number into its unique set of primes is unimaginably more
difficult. See supra note 3.
116. Computers facilitate the factoring of enormous composite numbers necessary to
crack many encryption systems. See Kleinjung et al., supra note 3. On the other hand, computers
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continues unabated, 17 such anticipated technological improvements
pose little threat to robust encryption schemes.118 Only a staggering
revolution in computing power would cast any real doubt on the utility
of encryption.11 9 Both the promise and peril of encryption arise from
its very effectiveness-properly implemented, a strong encryption
regime provides near absolute privacy.
120
B. An Appropriate Analogy
Since the common law often develops by analogy, 121 the
similarity-or lack thereof-between encrypted documents and other
types of subpoenaed materials must be carefully considered. While
the Pearson and Boucher courts apparently assumed that the private
papers doctrine applies to encrypted files,1 22 the propriety of this
presumption might depend on how encryption is conceptualized.
also aid in constructing a larger modulus from which to construct a stronger encryption system.
Id.
117. 'Moore's Law" predicted in 1965 that the number of transistors per integrated circuit
(a proxy for processing speed) would double every year. See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More
Components onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE, April 19, 1965, available at
ftp://download.intel.com/museum/Moores-Law/Articles-Press-Releases/Gordon-Moore_1965_
Article.pdf. This prediction has proven remarkably accurate through at least 2008. See also John
Markoff, After the Transistor, A Leap into the Microcosm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2O09/09/01/science/Oltrans.html?-r=l&ref=science.
118. But see Kleinjung et al., supra note 3 (reporting the successful factorization of a 232-
digit number, predicting that factorization of a 1024-bit RSA modulus is entirely possible within
the next decade, and warning that 1024-bit RSA encryption should be phased out in the next few
years).
119. In theory, quantum computing would seriously undermine any encryption strategy
based on factoring, but the creation of quantum computers have remained elusive. See Brent,
supra note 115, at 2 (citing P.W. Shor, Polynomial Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and
Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer, 26 SIAM J. COMPUTING 1484, 1484-1509 (1997),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/S0097539795
2 9 3 17 2 ).
120. See Reitinger, supra note 3, at 171 ("[T]he ability to encrypt information may provide
computer users with near absolute privacy for the content of their communications."). Dave
Cullinane, Chief Information Security Officer for eBay Marketplaces, has similarly opined:
"Encryption is almost certainly the best single solution and probably the ultimate line of defense
for protection of sensitive information." PGP, White Paper, PGP Webcast Summary: The Role of
Encryption in Data Protection (2007), available at http://download.pgp.com/pdfs/whitepapers/
PGP-Cullinane-Webcast WP 070205_F.pdf.
121. For example, the Copyright Act does not explicitly provide for secondary liability;
nevertheless, courts have developed the doctrine of vicarious liability by relying upon principles
from properly law. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting 'landlord-tenant" analogy adopted by district court, where defendant exercised
considerable control over "swap meet" featuring sales of counterfeit recordings, and following
"dance hall" line of cases: operator of entertainment venue rendered vicariously liable for
infringing performances if he (1) controls the premises and (2) obtains direct financial benefit
from audience paying to hear it). Id. at 261-65.
122. See supra Parts I.C.1 and I.C.2.
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1. Lost in Translation
If encryption is merely a translation, then a serious problem
arises. Under Fisher, the state may only subpoena voluntarily created
documents.123 Given a work of any complexity, however, a translation
necessarily creates a "new" document. 124 Indeed, critics revere George
Chapman's Iliad and Alexander Pope's Odyssey as much for the
translators' English as Homer's Greek. 125 Even setting aside the
rhythm and rhyme of poetry, "exact translations" are quite impossible
due to the puns, idioms, synonyms, and colloquialisms of everyday
speech. 1
26
Of course, translating ancient Greek into English differs
markedly from encrypting plaintext into ciphertext, 27 for the very
reason that two classics scholars would likely translate the same
document differently. Encryption precisely preserves all of the
original content; that is, encrypting and then decrypting a document
results in no loss of information-unlike translation, which
necessarily lacks such robustness.1 28 For example, if Pope were to
translate Chapman's Iliad back into ancient Greek, the retranslation
would not be mistaken for Homer's original. Indeed, even Chapman
could not retranslate Chapman's Iliad into the original. Arguably, at
least, encryption does not fundamentally alter the message, even
though retrieval of a readable form requires more than the naked eye.
123. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
124. See Reitinger, supra note 3, at 177 ('Translation, at least when performed by a
human being, involves the application of human reasoning and communication to a complex
problem, and can alter meaning or chance nuances easily.").
125. See generally Editor Eric, Translations of the Iliad, http://www.editoreric.com
greatlitltranslations/Iliad.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) (comparing a select few of the many
hundreds of translations of Homer's masterpiece - including the iconic versions of both Pope and
Chapman). John Keats later immortalized the Chapman translation in his eponymous sonnet.
John Keats, On First Looking into Chapman's Homer (1884), reprinted in THE OXFORD BOOK OF
ENGLISH VERSE, 634 (Sir Arthur Thomas Quilller-Couch ed., 1919), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/101/634.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). Cryptography purportedly
appears in Book VI of the Iliad, where Bellerophone carries a secret message ordering his own
death. See Cohen, supra note 103. Translations are themselves cryptic, however. See, e.g., The
Project Gutenberg Etext of The mad, by Homer, http://www.gutenberg.orgldirs/etextOO/
iliadl0.txt (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (translation by Samuel Butler, which speaks only of 'lying
letters of introduction, written on a folded tablet").
126. See BILL BRYSON, THE MOTHER TONGUE: ENGLISH AND HOW IT GOT THAT WAY
(Perennial 1990).
127. "Plaintext" refers to unencrypted or decrypted text; encrypted text is called
"ciphertext."
128. See Reitinger, supra note 3, at 177 ("Encryption [as contrasted with translation] is a
purely mechanistic process that does not of necessity add, subtract, or alter information.")
20101 PASSWORDS, PRIVACY, AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 601
After all, virtually any magnetic or electronic storage device-
be it microfiche or a Macintosh-entails modern technology to obtain
usable data. Even a printed document requires light to be read. It
would strain credulity to suggest that placing a document in a dark
room even temporarily alters its content. Though the message is not
currently perceivable, the flip of a switch immediately restores its
readability without any change to the document itself. As with other
storage technologies, from cassette tapes to flash drives, modern
encryption derives much of its utility from the ease with which a
properly equipped user can recover the original message.
2. Safe But Not Sound
Because translation provides a poor parallel, a different
analogy may be more apropos. Many commentators have likened
encryption to placing documents in a locked safe. 129 Indeed, this
simple comparison does capture an important functional aspect of
encrypted documents: with the right key, anyone can gain access, but
otherwise, recovery is extremely difficult and requires brute force.
While strong encryption provides virtually impenetrable protection, an
unauthorized user could theoretically gain access with exhaustive
effort,' 30 much like a burglar might attempt to defeat a wall safe by
trying all of the innumerable combinations. On the other hand, if the
anticipated time needed for a lucky guess exceeds the burglar's
lifetime, the stored documents would remain quite secure.
In some ways, then, the safe analogy does provide a useful
comparison to encryption, but significant dissimilarities may lead to
confusion. For example, an encrypted file is easy to delete without
opening, while the contents of a bank vault are virtually impossible to
destroy without first achieving access. More importantly, the contents
within a safe remain invariant-locking and unlocking the door does
not change the documents within. Encryption though, does change-
rather dramatically-the manifestation of the plaintext: thus "veni,
vidi, vici" becomes "zmqm, zmgm, zmfm."'
13
While a safe suggests physical sequestering, an encrypted
message could be published in the newspaper while still retaining the
same level of protection. Rather than sending a cipher, Caesar could
have placed his military instructions in a strongbox and had a legion
of soldiers march it to the front lines. The former technique uses
129. See supra note 66.
130. See supra note 3.
131. See supra note 107.
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encryption; the latter does not. This example illustrates a key feature
of encryption not shared by physical seclusion-the relative ease with
which secret information can be communicated. Over the Internet,
encrypted documents are easily transferred surreptitiously, while
delivering a wall safe would indeed require a small army. Such
shortcomings suggest that analyzing encryption by analogy to a safe
might be less than sound.' 32
3. Shredding the Safe Analogy
If encryption were truly analogous to locking documents in a
safe, then encrypted files should be treated like any other subpoenaed
materials. Placing papers in a safe cannot lawfully preclude a grand
jury from reading them any more than filing them in an unlocked
cabinet or saving them on a digital storage device. 133 Of course, the
government must clear the Fisher hurdles regarding existence,
location, and authentication; 134 a grand jury cannot compel the
opening of a safe on the off chance that relevant documents might be
found inside, but neither can it require the opening of an unlocked
desk drawer on the same pretense. 135 If encryption involves nothing
more than sequestering otherwise discoverable evidence, then
ciphertext indeed falls squarely within the private papers doctrine.
As indicated above, however, the safe analogy fails to capture
the essence of encryption. Unlike a steel briefcase, ciphertext thwarts
an unauthorized interceptor due to the inherent state of the message,
not because of an outer casing. Due largely to the ambiguity of
132. Neither the Pearson nor Boucher courts explicitly analogized encryption as a safe.
However, Pearson himself did characterize his files in this way-as did the company from which
he obtained the encryption software. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. Indeed,
many data security companies liken their encryption software to a safe or vault. Id. As this
analogy permeates the industry, courts are likely to adopt it--explicitly or otherwise-and the
features, including the defects, of the analogy might color the common law. Id.
133. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d at 93
("Production may not be refused 'if the government can demonstrate with reasonable
particularity that it knows of the existence and location of subpoenaed documents."') (quoting
United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1983)).
134. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976) ("Compliance with the subpoena
tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the
taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena.").
135. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d at 93 ("While
the contents of voluntarily prepared documents are not privileged, the act of producing them in
response to a subpoena may require incriminating testimony... 'if the existence and location of
the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government.') (quoting United States v. Fox, 721
F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1983)).
2010] PASSWORDS, PRIVACY, AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 603
languages, the translation analogy must be discarded, 136 but it at least
distinguishes the original document from the resulting ciphertext.
While the message or meaning of the text before and after encoding
may endure, the physical state of the document does not. The data
"scrambling" that encryption effectuates should challenge the
apparent assumption of courts and commentators alike who treat
compulsory decryption of previously encrypted material as voluntarily
created. The following thought experiment, although still imperfect,
may provide a meaningful improvement.
Imagine a burglar learns that important documents are stored
in a safe. To his surprise he finds the door unlocked. Upon removing
the papers however, he is dismayed to find that what had been
standard sheets of paper have been shredded into a thousand tiny
shards. On the back of each little sliver is a unique number from one
to one thousand. Alas, placing the scraps in numerical order reveals
no discernable message. While an appropriate ordering does exist,
only the person who shredded the document knows which of the
unimaginably many combinations unscrambles the code. Out of
disgust, the burglar might destroy the document or he might go ahead
and steal it, but he could not actually read it anytime soon.
This analogy captures several hallmarks of encryption. First,
such a mutilated document is quite unreadable in such a state.
Second, though exceedingly difficult, this kind of destruction lends
itself to complete restoration and future accessibility in a way that
burning it to ashes, for example, does not. Third, reconstruction of the
document requires no interpretation-an extremely tedious but
mechanistic application of the cipher would suffice. Fourth,
transmitting the message from sender to receiver requires no more
effort than conveyance of the original. Fifth, while the code could be
broken, either by chance or exhaustive effort, knowledge of the key
would hasten decryption by several orders of magnitude. 137 Finally,
the shredded document is not a copy of the original-it is the original.
All the bits that comprised the original still exist, and no others have
been created in the process.
Would unscrambling the bits create a new document? Could
the government compel that creation? The answers to these questions
might-but probably should not-depend on the nature of the
encrypted documents.
136. See supra Part II.B.1.
137. See supra note 3.
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III. COMMON LAW VERSUS COMMON SENSE
A. Ciphertext as "Private Papers"
The terms "plaintext" and "ciphertext" make sense when the
document to be encrypted actually and exclusively contains text. If
Julius Caesar needed to send a secret message-"Et tu, Brute?"-he
could employ his eponymous cipher, 138 but if he wished to include a
picture of Brutus, he would be out of luck. Since any digital medium
is ultimately a long string of ones and zeros, 139 however, encrypting
image or audio files is conceptually indistinguishable from encoding
actual text. Arguably, then, the law should treat all encrypted
documents uniformly, without regard to their content. At the very
least, in the interest of public policy, when audiovisual files consist
solely of pure contraband, the law should afford them no greater
protection than conventional private papers-and perhaps even less.
First, though, a word on "plaintext" qua text. Under the rubric
of a translation analogy, the Fifth Amendment would clearly preclude
the decryption of encrypted textual files, because responding to a
subpoena would entail the creation of new documents in contravention
of the Fisher requirement that only voluntarily created writings are
subject to compulsory production before a grand jury. 140 Assuming,
however, that the document warrants no protection, in spite of its
private nature, before encryption, it makes little sense to deprive the
grand jury of relevant evidence, after the encoding, merely because
the author has transformed it into an even more private form. Once
the government and the judiciary have decided that the potential
probative value entitles a grand jury to examine a document, what
rationale can justify its seclusion on account of the author having
taken pains to sequester it? The purely mechanistic nature of
encryption and decryption weighs against tolerating such a defense.
Certainly, if the author can, with minimal effort, produce the
subpoenaed document in readable form, exactly as he had written it,
such action can hardly be construed as compelling the defendant to be
a "witness against himself."'41 If the law is otherwise, then either the
law should be changed or the analogy discarded. As noted above,
many reasons support the latter approach. 42
138. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
139. See Representing Binary Quantities, http://www.eelab.usyd.edu.au/digital-tutorial/
chapterl/1-4.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
140. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142. See supra Part II.B.3.
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As contended above, the prototypical safe should be replaced
with the shredder analogy. Whichever metaphor is decided upon,
however, the outcome should remain the same: taking pains to hide
discoverable evidence should not augment its legal protection.
Moreover, the reconstruction of extant shards, though transformative,
cannot plausibly be considered a new document for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. The document has always existed, though the
message had been temporarily garbled in its encrypted state. That
the defendant, rather than the government, can quickly obtain a
readable version of the document should not render it immune from
subpoena. Most documents, especially electronically-stored
information, can be compiled more easily by their possessor than by
any other person. Hence, in a civil case, the parties bear the burden of
producing their own documents for the sake of efficiency. 143 That
encryption makes for an especially stark disparity-the government
would require years to obtain the plaintext while the defendant could
decode the ciphertext in a matter of seconds-weighs in favor of
discoverability and not against it. Absent exceptionally strong
countervailing privacy interests, encryption should not obstruct the
truth-seeking function of both grand and petit juries.
B. The Square Peg of Contraband
At least in the case of pure contraband, a fundamental problem
arises in conceptualizing encryption as a reversible shredding process
instead of the proverbial safe. Another thought experiment illustrates
the underlying difficulty. Imagine the world's most accomplished
bomb maker, Mr. Bombardier, has just finished his latest creation-a
particularly complex, intricate, and fragile explosive-when the police
burst into his workshop. A lesser bomb maker would probably place
the device in a safe, if one were available, but doing so could hardly
protect it from a subpoena. By blowtorch, if necessary, the
government could open the safe and recover the bomb.
Fortunately for Mr. Bombardier, a very clever craftsman
indeed, this bomb contains a "self-deconstruct" button. Rather than
exploding when depressed, the bomb merely flies apart into its myriad
components. While circumstantial evidence may suggest that the
assorted parts had once constituted an explosive, in no sense can the
various screws and wires be considered a bomb now. Suppose that,
with years of effort, an explosives expert might be able to reconstruct
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
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the bomb, while Mr. Bombardier himself could definitely rebuild it-
and much more quickly.
Presumably, no trial court would compel Mr. Bombardier to
reconstitute into contraband sundry components that, in their current
state, are unrecognizable as such. 144 Could a court compel him to tell
government explosive experts how to rebuild the bomb? Surely any
such instructions lie squarely within the category of compelled,
incriminating testimony that the Fifth Amendment precludes.
145
Though a bit pinched, this hypothetical nevertheless suggests a
disquieting thought: perhaps the Self-Incrimination Clause actually
prevents the government from demanding the decryption of encrypted
contraband, such as child pornography-even when its existence and
location are known to the government and can be independently
authenticated.
Encryption presents difficulties precisely because its
uniqueness renders it incomparable to more familiar kinds of
evidence. Rarely, if ever, can the defendant-but not the
government-reconstitute "destroyed" evidence already seized by the
state. Of course, when criminal suspects attempt to destroy or conceal
evidence, the government may endeavor to find or reconstruct it.
Thus, a drug dealer who dissolves illicit powder in water has not
really destroyed the evidence, since recovery of the solute is the stuff
of middle school science experiments, but neither does the government
require any special knowledge on his part to recover the contraband.
Moreover, the government generally obtains contraband by seizing
it-with or without a warrant. Where a grand jury demands
production of an unencrypted copy of an encrypted file thought to
contain contraband (as opposed to the key with which to decrypt it),
the government does nothing less than subpoena contraband. Such a
procedure is a huge departure from the "mere evidence" rule of Gouled
that prohibited the government from seizing private papers (even with
a warrant) from the house of a person solely for the purpose of
collecting incriminating evidence against the owner. 146 If the law
allows the government to subpoena such materials, it underscores the
144. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 ("It is the 'extortion of information from
the accused,' Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973), the attempt to force him 'to
disclose the contents of his own mind,' Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957), that
implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause."); Id. at 220 ("If John Doe can be compelled to use his
mind to assist the Government in developing its case, I think he will be forced 'to be a witness
against himself."') (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988) ("Historically, the privilege was
intended to prevent the use of legal compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn
communication of facts which would incriminate him.")
146. Gould v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921); see supra note 25.
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enormous erosion in Fifth Amendment protection that has occurred
over the last century, at least as applied to private papers.
147
Yet, allowing the Fifth Amendment to thwart the disclosure of
pure contraband, while diaries and datebooks enjoy no such
protection, 148 defies common sense. Whether or not genuinely private
writings should enjoy greater Fifth Amendment protection than
current precedent recognizes, affording additional protection to pure
contraband-particularly such invidious material as child
pornography-surely contravenes public policy. This Note does not
suggest otherwise; it merely acknowledges the "tyranny of small
decisions" that characterizes common law development.1 49 Application
of the private papers doctrine to encrypted contraband might be
logical, but the Self-Incrimination Clause has drifted far from its
original mooring in Entick where the contraband seized by the
government consisted of seditious papers.
150
Rather than blindly applying the private papers doctrine to
every private document that could conceivably be transcribed to paper,
courts would be wiser to clear out the undergrowth beneath an
increasingly arcane Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 151  Absent
Supreme Court guidance however, such pruning can scarcely occur at
the ground level of trial courts, which must apply the law-not
improve it.152 Ubiquitous encryption lies just beyond the horizon, and
147. See supra Part I.A.
148. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87,
90 (2d Cir. 1993).
149. A.E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions, 101 KYKLOS 23, 23-46 (1966), available
at http://opusljournal.org/articles/article.asp?docID=140 ("Decisions that are small in size, time
perspective, and in relation to their cumulative effect may lead to suboptimal resource
allocation.").
150. Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.)
151. A partial list of compelled, incriminating acts deemed non-testimonial by the
Court-and hence beyond the scope of Fifth Amendment privilege-suggests that the exceptions
have swallowed the rule. See Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight 493 U.S. 549
(1990) (producing child); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988) (authorizing disclosure of
bank records); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (reporting accident); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (providing handwriting exemplar); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (providing voice recording); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (providing blood
sample); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (maintaining required records); United
States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (filing income tax return); Holt v. United States 218 U.S.
245 (1910) (put on shirt). Indeed, "the privilege against self-incrimination" no longer accurately
describes that Constitutional provision. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000)
('The term 'privilege against self-incrimination' is not an entirely accurate description of a
person's constitutional protection against being 'compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.')
152. Even while advocating in support of ratifying the pending Constitution, by quelling
concerns that the proposed judiciary would exercise undue power over legislative bodies,
"Publius" acknowledged, nevertheless, the imperative of judicial restraint. See THE FEDERALIST
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it portends a gathering storm for law enforcement agents-the
confluence of near absolute privacy with profligate dissemination. As
the utility and availability of encryption technologies inevitably
advance, so too must the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
As both the use and utility of encryption increase, the dilemma
faced by law enforcement agencies in Pearson and Boucher will
become more common: the government, having lawfully seized
encrypted contraband, will find itself unable to admit the files into
evidence-not because of the exclusionary rule, but due to the
technical difficulty of decoding ciphertext without the key. While
defendants with much to hide might well choose contempt over
compliance, the law ought to at least afford prosecutors the legal right
to subpoena either the decrypted copy or the password enabling that
decryption. The limited case law on point, all from federal district
courts in the Second Circuit, appears to comport with this policy
objective, subject to the restrictions of Fisher and subsequent Second
Circuit precedent: the government must prove the existence and
location of the subpoenaed documents and possess independent
evidence, other than compliance with the court order, for
authenticating them. 15
3
While the law may thus appear to adequately safeguard the
interest of law enforcement in fighting the bundle of child
pornography crimes that encryption greatly facilitates, enterprising
lawyers can surely craft colorable arguments that encrypted
documents should lie outside of the private papers doctrine altogether.
Of course, whether that would open to door for greater, rather than
less, Fifth Amendment protection remains to be seen. In any event,
courts should recognize that the unique nature of encrypted
documents at least warrants an independent analysis distinct from
other private papers. The current rationale for not distinguishing
No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) ('The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should
be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequences would . . . be the
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."); Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule.") (Marshall, C.J.)
153. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9-*10, (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009), and United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-
CR-340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *58-*59, *62, (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006), affd, 570 F.3d
480 (2d Cir. 2009), with Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411-413 (1976), and In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993).
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between unencrypted and encrypted files appears to be an implicit
assumption that the latter are not meaningfully different from the
former when stored electronically. The Boucher and Pearson courts
might also have likened encryption of documents to their placement in
a locked safe, as many security companies and commentators have so
analogized.
The day may soon arrive when an adequately briefed court will
recognize the deficiencies of this simple comparison, which will call
into doubt the previous decisions implicitly premised upon it. This
Note has proposed an alternative analogy that, while still imperfect,
may provide a better foundation upon which to construct a more
satisfying theory. Conceptualizing an encrypted document as having
been shredded into myriad pieces, and those pieces labeled with a
unique sequence known only to the encoder, captures several
important features of encryption. In particular, the original message,
while currently unreadable, has been preserved in a very real sense,
and can be reconstituted in every detail through purely mechanistic
means. This analysis weighs in favors of treating encrypted
documents the same as other private papers-essentially preserving
the status quo, with the possible exception of encrypted contraband.
Contraband might be more problematic because forcing
defendants to reconstitute into contraband material currently
unrecognizable as such seems counterintuitive and unprecedented.
Compelling defendants to assist the government in perceiving
confiscated materials, which will then facilitate their conviction-
while unusual, and perhaps unsavory-nevertheless compares
favorably to the alternative: effectively granting encrypted contraband
greater Fifth Amendment protection than that currently afforded
genuinely private writings such as diaries. Whether or not encrypted
documents constitute contraband, public policy weighs against further
constraints-beyond those of Fisher-on the subpoena power of grand
juries.
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